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ABSTRACT
Using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data for individual foreign acquisitions and new
establishments in the U.S from 1988 to 1998, and aggregate data for 1980 to 1998, we find that
acquisitions and establishments of new firms tend to occur in periods of high U.S. growth and  take
place mainly in industries in which the investing country has some comparative advantage in exporting.
New establishments are largely in industries of U.S. comparative disadvantage, and the relation of U.S.
comparative advantage to takeovers is also negative, but never significant.  High U.S. stock prices,
industry profitability, and industry growth discourage takeovers.  High U.S interest rates and high
investing country growth and currency values encourage takeovers.  
Direct  investments in acquisitions and new establishments thus tend to flow in the same
direction as trade.  They originate in countries with comparative advantages in particular industries and
flow to industries of U.S. comparative disadvantage.
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zadia_feliciano@qc.edu  The United States became a magnet for international direct investment flows in the late 
1980s, reversing its former, and traditional, position as mainly a supplier of direct investment to 
other countries.  After some decline in the early 1990s, the inflows again expanded rapidly, 
reaching a twenty-year peak in 2000 before a sharp decline, by almost half, in 2001, especially in 
the second half of the year.  Most of the direct investment inflow has been in the form of 
acquisitions of U.S. firms by foreign owners.  Over the last twenty years, foreign firms have 
spent over $1 trillion on these acquisitions and acquired more than $2 trillion in U.S. firm assets.  
The purpose of this paper is to explain the timing and the anatomy of new foreign direct 
investment in the United States.  Using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data for individual 
firms from 1988 to 1998 we construct panels of foreign acquisitions and new establishments by 
industry and country of ultimate beneficial owner (UBO).  We use this panel to examine the 
question of what determines changes in the percent of total U.S. assets taken over or in newly 
established foreign firms, what determines the industries in which takeovers and new 
establishments occur, and what influences the country sources of these investments. 
We examine the macro economic conditions of countries making the investments, the 
industries into which the investments have flowed, the relation between the countries making 
investments in the U.S. and the industries targeted, and the differences between determinants of  
takeovers and of the establishment new enterprises.   The analysis by country and industry, not 
feasible without the use of confidential individual firm data at the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
expands the current literature and provides us with a better understanding of why and when these 
investments take place. 
Outlays for additions to the universe of foreign- owned firms in the United States consist 
of those for new establishments and those for acquisitions of existing firms.  An establishment   2 
 
 
takes place if “…the foreign parent or its existing U.S. affiliate creates a new legal entity that is 
organized and begins operating as a new U.S. business enterprise or directly purchases U.S. real 
estate.”  An acquisition takes place if “…the foreign parent or its existing U.S, affiliate obtains a 
voting equity interest of 10 per cent or more in an existing U.S. business enterprise and continues 
to operate it as a separate legal entity or purchases a business segment or operating unit of an 
existing U.S. business and organizes it as a new separate legal entity.  A U.S. business is also 
categorized as ‘acquired’ if an existing U.S. affiliate purchases a U.S. business, a segment of a 
U.S. business, or an operating unit of a U.S. business and merges it into its own operations.” 
(Howenstine and Troia, 2000, pp. 58-59).  The foreign acquisitions have far exceeded the new 
establishments. Our data show that, between 1988 and 1998, outlays for acquisitions accounted 
for 83% of outlays for acquisitions and new establishments. 
  Figure 1 shows the increase in the absolute value of assets in acquisitions and in new 
foreign establishments in the United States between 1980 and 1998.   Figure 2 shows that there 
were no trends in the ratio of assets of acquired and newly established foreign firms to total 
corporate assets in the United States. 
  Much of the literature on foreign takeovers and other investment inflows has 
concentrated on the impact of exchange rate movements and, to a smaller extent, stock price 
movements, on their size and timing.  The relation to exchange rates has sometimes been taken 
to represent a price effect, with declines in a currency value thought to lower the price of a 
country’s assets and therefore encourage their purchase by foreigners.  Froot and Stein (1991) 
argued, in explaining the capital inflows of the 1970s and 1980s, that since buyers from all 
countries would have access to the same international capital markets, a price decline brought 
about by currency depreciation would be the same for buyers regardless of their location, and   3 
 
 
would not favor foreign buyers.  They suggested instead that the effect of currency value changes 
was a wealth effect, making holders of the depreciating currency poorer and holders of the 
appreciating currency richer, and that it was through this wealth effect that a depreciation of the 
currency favored foreign bidders for business assets.   They also suggested that this theory is 
supported by evidence on the effects of stock price movements, such as those in Japan between 
1987 and 1991.  
Klein and Rosengren (1990) further tested the wealth hypothesis by regressing FDI 
outlays from 1971 to 1991 on the real exchange rate, relative labor costs and relative stock 
market values.  The evidence strongly supports the wealth hypothesis over the relative labor cost 
hypothesis.
1  Using transaction- specific data on foreign acquisitions of U.S. targets from 1975 to 
1989, Dewenter (1995) found that when the relative stock market value is included as an 
explanatory variable, FDI flows are not significantly affected by exchange rates.   
The literature on the characteristics of firms acquired by foreign investors is more 
limited.  Using a sample of firms acquired by foreign and domestic firms in 1988, Chen (1997) 
finds that foreign acquisitions are more common in industries with low average annual growth 
rates in value added, higher capital-labor ratios, lower market concentration ratios and lower 
import tariff rates. Gonzalez and Vasconcellos (1998) studied foreign acquisitions during the 
1981-1990 period using a control sample of companies and found that U.S. companies with 
lower returns on equity and lower sales growth are more likely to be taken over by foreign firms. 
They view these findings as evidence of inefficient management of the domestic companies 
targeted by foreign firms. 
                                                 
1 The relative-labor-cost theory argues that relative labor costs across major industrial countries have been largely 
determined by currency movements during the floating exchange rate period.  The wealth theory argues that the 
wealth of firms relative to their foreign counterparts rises with a currency appreciation.   4 
 
 
  In this paper we use panel data on assets acquired through foreign direct investment, by 
industry and country of origin (UBO), from the Bureau of Economic Analysis BE-13 survey of 
new and acquired foreign establishments in the U.S.
2   By federal law, all foreign entities 
acquiring or establishing U.S. firms must notify the U.S. government and complete the survey.  
Thus, the response rate is close to 100%. These data for individual firms are not publicly 
available since they are confidential and confidentiality problems have limited the publication 
even of detailed country and industry data.  For this reason, they have not been previously used 
to analyze foreign direct investments in the U.S.  
For this study, data were aggregated to 50 industries and twelve of the more important 
investing countries.  These data were then merged with the U.S. Internal Revenue Survey 
Statistics of Income for Corporations, representing complete coverage of U.S. corporations. 
We can think of each country as having a population of entrepreneurs more skilled in 
managing some industries than others.  A rise in country A’s currency value will increase the 
wealth of its entrepreneurs and raise their demand for firms in country B, especially in industries 
where they can improve productivity or profitability.  A rise in prices of equities in country A 
would have similar effects.  Within the host country, the sale of assets in its less efficient 
industries would free capital to move to the country’s more efficient sectors. 
  An economic development that would affect acquisitions, but not necessarily new 
establishments, would be a worldwide decline in the cost of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions.  If we imagine two countries with managerial skills in different industry sectors, a 
decline in acquisition costs or a liberalization of acquisition rules would mean that country A’s 
firms would tend to acquire country B firms in the sectors where country A firms are superior.  
                                                 
2 The title of the survey is Internal Report on a Foreign Person’s Direct or Indirect Acquisitions, establishment or 
purchase of the operating assets, of a U.S. Business Enterprise, Including Real Estate.  It is both mandatory and   5 
 
 
Country B’s firms would acquire country A firms in the sectors of country B’s superiority.  Both 
countries would gain in efficiency as their entrepreneurs’ capital moved to sectors in which they 
were most skilled and out of industries in which they were least skilled.  Such liberalization of 
cross-border mergers might account for trends in merger activity if we find them. 
  While investment outlays might reflect the market for control of assets, they do not 
reflect the size of the impact on host countries, since a given outlay could purchase control of 
various amounts of assets, depending on how leveraged the target firms were or became.  To 
study host-country impacts, we use the measure of assets of acquired and established firms.  To 
allow for the possibility that capital markets are segmented by country, interest rates in home and 
host countries can be included in the equations.  
Equation 1 uses the publicly available data for aggregate takeover activity, which cover 
the period 1980 to 1990 (U.S. Department of Commerce, BEA, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c and 2000), 
with some of the variables suggested by earlier literature, to explain the share of total assets 
acquired. 
 
AAt is total assets acquired in year t by foreign entities.  TAt is total U.S. corporate assets. 
ProfUSt is the average profitability of US corporations (net income after taxes/assets). ProfAt-1 is 
the average profitability of acquired firms during the year prior to takeover. Stockt is the price of 
U.S. stocks measured by the Standards and Poors 500. ROWStockt is a weighted average of stock 
prices of the top 12 countries making foreign direct investments in the U.S.
3 RExt is the real 
                                                                                                                                                             
confidential information. 
3   A fixed weight was used based on the proportion of investments made by each country in 1980. 
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effective exchange rate in year t (value of the dollar). Intt is the short-term interest rate in the 
United States. GDPGrt, is the GDP real growth rate.   
Several versions of this equation are shown in Table 1.  The best of these equations 
includes both the average profitability of all U.S. corporations and the average profitability of the 
acquired firms in the year before takeover.  The only variables significant at the 5 percent level 
are the real effective exchange rate and the interest rate.  The real effective exchange rate (value 
of the dollar) has the expected negative sign.  A higher price for the dollar discourages takeovers, 
as earlier aggregate studies have found.  U.S. interest rates have an unexpected positive 
coefficient, suggesting the effect of a tight U.S. credit market on U.S. target firms.  The 
coefficient for U.S. Profitability has a negative sign but it is not significant.    
Table 2 represents an equation similar to equation 1, for new establishments.  The 
variable for the previous year’s profitability is omitted, since a new firm has no previous year. 
The coefficient for U.S. profitability negative, but not significant, as for takeovers.  The U.S. 
stock price index is a significantly negative influence when U.S. average profitability is not 
included.  The coefficient for ROW Stock Price is positive and significant.  This result is 
consistent with the wealth effect literature.  The interest rate coefficient is positive, as it is for 
takeovers.  The exchange rate, important for takeovers, is negative, but not significant for new 
establishments.  Thus the main differences between the explanations for takeovers and for new 
establishments are, for the latter, the negative and significant coefficient for the U.S. stock price 
index and the positive and significant coefficient for ROW stock price index. 
The variables included in equation 1 can be thought of as reflecting the macroeconomic 
situation in the US and investing countries.  The results suggest that there are macroeconomic 
influences on flows of direct investment, although what Froot and Stein (1991, p. 1192) refer to   7 
 
 
as “the modern theory of FDI,” perhaps more appropriately the ancient theory of FDI, stresses 
microeconomic influences.  These are the firm-specific advantages that enable a firm to operate 
in an alien environment despite the advantages of local knowledge and experience that host 
country firms presumably possess.  In their words, “A German auto manufacturer…may be able 
to manage an existing plant more efficiently than his U.S. counterpart, and would be willing to 
pay a price that exceeds the American’s valuation” (ibid).  Our interest is mainly in the country 
sources and industry destinations of the investment flows.  That is, who is taking over existing 
U.S. firms or establishing new ones?  In which industries are U.S. firms being acquired by 
foreigners or are new foreign firms being established?  And what is the relationship between the 
country sources of the investment inflow and the industries to which it is going? 
There are two more or less competing explanations for the sources and directions of the 
direct investment inflow.  One is that foreign firms wish to gain access to U.S. locational 
advantages, based on U.S. factor endowments or U.S. technological skills that are specific to the 
country rather than to U.S. firms.  In that case, we would expect to find that investment would be 
attracted to industries in which the United States had some comparative advantage in trade.  
The second explanation is that foreign firms have built up firm-specific advantages in 
their own countries, based on their home countries’ current or past comparative advantages, and 
wish to exploit these in the United States, where firms have lost, or never acquired, these skills.  
In that case, we would expect to find that investment would flow to industries of U.S. 
comparative disadvantage, and would come from firms in industries in which their own home 
countries had comparative advantages in trade.  That this type of flow might be a characteristic 
of direct, in contrast to portfolio, investment was suggested many years ago by John Dunning 
(1970, p. 4).   8 
 
 
To examine this question, we assume that investing companies’ firm-specific advantages 
are associated with their countries’ comparative advantages in trade.  We identify these with the 
“revealed” export comparative advantage of the United States and each investing country.  That 
is measured by the share of an industry in a country’s exports relative to its share in world 
exports.   
If the first explanation is correct, we would expect that U.S. comparative advantage in an 
industry would be positively associated with investment inflows, and a foreign country’s 
comparative advantage in an industry would be associated with low levels of investment in the 
United States.  If the second explanation were correct, we would expect that a comparative 
advantage for the United States in an industry would discourage foreign firms from entering.  
And we would expect that a comparative advantage in industry i of country j relative to the 
United States would have a positive effect on country j’s acquisitions and establishments of U.S. 
firms in industry i. 
  We first look for the influence of U.S. comparative advantage in equation 2 by examining  
inflows by industry, for 50 manufacturing industries, not disaggregating by country of origin. 
 
AAit is the acquired assets by foreign entities in industry i and year t, TAit is the total U.S. 
corporate assets in industry i and year t, Profit is the average profitability of US corporations (net 
income after taxes/assets) in industry i and year t, SalesGrit is the average growth rate of sales in 
industry i and year t, StockUSt is the price of stocks in the U.S. in year t (Standards and Poors 
500), RExUSt is the real effective exchange rate in year t (value of the dollar), IntUSt is the short 
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term interest rate in the U.S. in year t, GDPGrUSt, is the GDP real growth rate in year t and 
USCompAdvit is the U.S. comparative advantage in year t and Indi represents 49 industry 
dummies.  The results for several versions of this equation are shown in Table 3 for foreign 
acquisitions and in Table 4 for newly established foreign firms. 
  In Table 3, of the macroeconomic variables, the U.S. Stock price, the U.S. interest rate, 
and U.S. GDP growth rate appear to be significant influences on the rate of acquisition within 
industries.  High U.S. stock prices are associated with lower levels of acquisitions.  Higher U.S. 
GDP growth rates are associated with increases in the share of assets acquired.  The U.S. interest 
rate is positively related to acquisitions.  Of the industry variables, the profitability of industries 
is negatively related to takeovers, reinforcing the previous results that takeovers occur when 
overall profitability is low.  U.S. industry sales growth is negatively related to acquisitions.  The 
coefficient for U.S. comparative advantage is negative but not significant.  Both industry and 
year dummies add to the explanation, and the equation omitting the exchange rate and U.S. 
interest rates, but including industry and year dummies, is the best of the four.  The year 
dummies probably pick up the influence of some of the macroeconomic variables, but they also 
perform another important function.  That is to allow for some of the lumpiness of major 
acquisitions, which produce extreme outliers, as must have been the case, for example, for the 
Daimler takeover of Chrysler. 
  There are a number of possible explanations for the industry dummy variables.  They 
could reflect the comparative advantages of the United States, with U.S. comparative advantage 
deterring takeovers.  Another possibility is that they might be unrelated to any country’s 
comparative advantage but reflect worldwide movements toward consolidation of some   10 
 
 
industries into larger units.  In that case, firms in country A are buying firms in country B at the 
same time as firms in country B are buying firms in country A.   
  The equations for new establishments are quite different from the acquisition equations 
(see Table 4).  The US GDP growth rate has a positive and significant influence on the 
establishment of new foreign operations, as expected.  The U.S. stock price index is not 
significant.  U.S. comparative advantage in an industry appears as a negative influence on new 
establishments in equations omitting the industry dummies.  The industry dummies reflect U.S. 
comparative advantage plus other industry characteristics.    
Since different potential investing countries would be expected to possess different 
comparative advantages, we further disaggregate inflows by country, for the 12 largest U.S.  
investors.  The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. These countries account 
for 85% of the value of acquisitions.  The corresponding equation is equation 3. 
 
AAijt is the assets acquired by foreign entities from country j in industry i and year t, TAit is the 
total U.S. corporate assets in industry i and year t, Profit, SalesGrit, tockUSt, RExUSt,  IntUSt, 
GDPGrUSt,USCompAdvit and Indi are defined as before.   The additional variables StockFjt, 
RexFjt, IntFjt, GDPGrFjt, and FCompAdvit are defined as the stock price, the price of US $ in 
terms of the foreign currency, the interest rate, the GDP growth and Comparative Advantage of 
foreign countries making the investments.  A country dummy variable Cntryj has been also 
included. The country dummy variables are introduced as a crude way to take account of the 
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very different sizes of the potential investing countries, as well as of country differences in the 
extent of involvement in U.S. financial markets.   
The results for several versions of this equation are given in Table 5 for foreign 
acquisitions, and in Table 6 for new establishments of foreign firms.  Acquisitions tended to be 
higher when industry profitability and growth in net income and sales were lower than average.  
Growth of sales is significant in all specifications and both variables are significant at the 5 
percent level in the fourth specification.  Acquisitions are negatively related to the U.S. stock 
price, as expected, and positively related to the U.S. growth rate.  As before, the US interest rate 
appears to be positively related to acquisitions.  Foreign countries invest more when their GDP is 
growing faster and when the exchange values of their currencies are higher.  Foreign stock prices 
are not significantly related to acquisitions. 
  Another strong influence on acquisitions is the foreign country’s comparative 
advantage.  The coefficient is significant only when industry dummies are not included, since 
comparative advantage measures do not vary significantly from year to year, and therefore tend 
to be obliterated by industry dummies.  Foreign firms have been acquiring U.S. firms in 
industries in which their countries have a comparative advantage in exports.   U.S. comparative 
advantage in an industry is expected to be an obstacle to foreign takeovers, but that coefficient, 
while negative, is never significant. 
  Investments in new foreign- owned firms are more difficult to predict in terms of 
macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. or the foreign country.  The only significant 
macroeconomic variable shown in Table 6 is U.S. GDP growth.  New investments appear to be 
more closely related to the comparative advantage in the foreign country and the U.S. All 
regressions show a significant and positive influence of foreign countries’ comparative   12 
 
 
advantage in an industry on new investments (Table 6).  In addition, they show a significant 
negative effect of U.S. comparative advantage when the industry dummy variables are not 
included.  When they are included, the U.S. comparative advantage coefficient disappears, 
indicating that the influence of U.S. comparative advantage involves differences across 
industries, but not changes over time.  
 
Conclusions 
  To analyze takeovers and new investments we used aggregate data (19 years), industry 
data (11 years and 50 industries) and industry by country data (11 years, 50 industries and 12 
countries). The aggregate data show that foreign acquisitions and new firm establishments both 
tend to occur at times of relatively low U.S. firm profitability, but high U.S. interest rates.  
Acquisitions are discouraged by high values of the U.S. dollar, but new establishments are not.  
New establishments, but not acquisitions, tend to take place in years of high U.S. stock prices. 
In the industry and industry-by-country data, we find that acquisitions and establishments 
of new firms tend to occur in periods of high U.S. GDP growth and both take place mainly in 
industries in which the investing country has some comparative advantage in exporting relative 
to the world.  New establishments are largely in industries of U.S. comparative disadvantage, and 
the relation of U.S. comparative advantage to takeovers is also negative, but never significant. 
The other macro and industry variables seem to influence only takeovers.  High U.S. 
stock prices, industry profitability, and industry growth discourage takeovers.  High U.S. interest 
rates and GDP growth and high growth and high values for currencies in investing countries 
encourage takeovers.  Thus there is some support in these data for the influence of investing 
country and receiving country wealth effects on takeovers.  There is stronger evidence for the   13 
 
 
importance of industry and country specific influences.  Direct investments flow in the same 
direction as trade, from countries with comparative advantages in particular industries to 
industries of U.S. comparative disadvantage, particularly when those U.S. industries are growing 
slowly and are relatively unprofitable.  The positive influence of high U.S. interest rates may also 
reflect periods of financial stringency for U.S. enterprises.  
  Inflows of direct investment into the United States occur mainly in industries in which 
the United States is not an international leader.  And they tend to originate in countries that are 
leaders in those industries.  Both facts suggest that foreign takeovers of existing U.S. firms and 
the establishment of new foreign-owned firms tend to put U.S. establishments and U.S. assets in 
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Data Definitions and Sources 
The aggregate data on takeovers are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1989, 1993, 2000a, 
and 2000b).  These are based on the data recorded in the BEA’s survey form BE-13, and 
the original returns from that survey are the basis for the analysis by country and 
industry. 
U.S. and other country (UBO) growth in GDP are taken from U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1998, 1999, and 2000) and from the World Bank’s 1999 World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM and the World Bank web site. 
Business profitability in the aggregate for each country is Operating surplus of corporate and 
quasi-corporate enterprises as per cent of gross product of such enterprises, and is from 
OECD National Accounts, Vol. II. 
Share prices, interest rates, nominal exchange rates, and the U.S. real effective exchange rate are 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM, lines reu, rf or rh, 60p, and 62. 
U.S. corporate assets and profits, by industry, are from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
Statistics of Income from Corporations. 
Comparative advantage is calculated from the NBER World Trade Data Base (Feenstra, Bowen, 
and Lipsey, 1997), updated from later versions of the Statistics Canada World Trade Data 
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Established 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.16
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Note: U.S. total assets for 1998 is extrapolated from 1997 & 1998 total assets figures from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (2000).
Sources: U.S. Internal Revenue Service (1997) and the same series in the previous issues; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (1999a), (1999b), (1999c), and (2000); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2000).
Figure1. Assets in Foreign Acquisitions and Establishments of New Firms in U.S.























Table 1:  Determinants of Foreign Takeovers in the United States 
Aggregate Data, 1980-1998 
Dependent Variable: Acquired Assets/Total U.S. Assets 
        
  (1)  (2)  (3)  
        
US  Profitability     -0.045  -0.046  
     (0.057)  (0.057)  
        
Acquired  Firm  Profitability       0.031   
       (0.034)   
        
US Stock Price  -0.011
 *  -0.007  -0.007  
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
        
ROW Stock Price
1 0.014
 *  0.011  0.010  
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  
        




 *  
  (2.740)  (2.800)  (2.880)  
        
Interest Rate  0.064
 ** 0.080
 ** 0.060   
  (0.021)  (0.029)  (0.037)  
        
GDP  Growth  Rate  0.005  0.003  -0.008  
  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.030)  
      
Number  of  Observations  19  19  19  
AAdjusted R-Squared
  0.30  0.28  0.27  
       
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level  
 
Sources: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999a), (1999b), 
(1999c), and (2000). 
International Monetary Fund (2000). 
United States President (2001). 
 
1.ROW Stock Price is a weighted average of stock prices of the top 12 countries 
making   foreign direct investments in the U.S. A fixed weight was used based on the 




Table 2:  Determinants of New Establishments in the United 
States Aggregate Data, 1980-1998 
Dependent Variable: Newly Established Assets/Total U.S. Assets 
 (1)    (2)   
        
US Profitability      -0.010   
     (0.008)   
        
US Stock Price 
  -.002
 ** -.001  
 (0.001)    (0.001)   
        
ROW Stock Price
1  0.003
 ** 0.002   
 (0.001)    (0.001)   
        
Real Effective Ex-rate x 10
-3  -0.341  -0.394  
 (0.410)    (0.405)   
        
Interest Rate  0.008
 ** 0.012
 ** 
 (0.003)    (0.004)   
        
GDP Growth Rate   -.001    -.002   
 (.004)    (.004)   
    
Number of Observations  19    19   
AAdjusted R-Squared
  0.21  0.24  
        Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level  
 
Sources:  
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999a), 
 (1999b), (1999c), and (2000). 
International Monetary Fund (2000). 
United States Government Printing Office (2001). 
 
           1.Row stock price is a weighted average of stock prices of the top 12 countries  
making foreign direct investments in the U.S. A fixed weight was used based on 




Table 3: Determinants of Foreign Entry in U.S. industries, 1988-1998: Acquisitions 
Dependent Variable: Assets Acquired / Total Assets in the Industry 
          
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
          
(Net Income After Taxes/ Total 
Assets for the Industry)*100  -.0147     -.1053  *  -.0357    -.1678  ** 
  (.0348)     (.0600)     (.0381)     (.0696)    
          
Growth in Sales for the Industry*100  -.0168  *   -.0176  **  -.0165  *   -.0171  ** 
   (.0089)     (.0089)     (.0087)     (.0086)    
                          
Stock Prices – US  -.0106  **  -.0106  **         
   (.0032)     (.0031)            
                          
Real Effective Exchange Rate –US  -.0078     -.0087                
   (.0124)     (.0129)                
                          
Interest Rate – US  .2280  **  .2435  **            
   (.0680)     (.0679)                
               
GDP Growth Rate - US  .2720  **  .3012  **        
  (.0831)    (.0837)         
               
Comparative Advantage – US  -.1130     -.2220     -.1044     -.1214    
    (.0870)  (.4437)  (.0864)  (.4464)  
          
Industry Dummies  No     Yes     No     Yes    
Year Dummies  No     No    Yes     Yes    
Number of Observations  550     550     550     550    
Adj R-squared  .06     .24     .08     .26    
 
Numbers in Parentheses are Standard Errors. 




Table 4: Determinants of Rates of Foreign Entry in U.S. Industries, 1988-1998: New 
Establishments 
Dependent Variable:  Assets of New Foreign Establishments / Total Assets in the Industry 
          
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
          
Net Income After Taxes/ Total Assets  .0060    -.0034    .0051    -.0067   
For the Industry  (.0067)    (.0082)    (.0065)    (.0086)   
            
Sales in Year t/ Sales in Year t-1  .0005    .0005    .0003    .0003   
    (.0006)  (.0007)  (.0006)  (.0006)  
            
Stock Prices – US  -.0005    -.0005           
  (.0003)    (.0003)       
            
Real Effective Exchange Rate –US  -.0032    -.0033           
    (.0032)    (.0029)       
            
Interest Rate – US  .0105    .0120           
    (.0094)    (.0092)       
          
GDP Growth Rate – US  .0147  **  .0178  **         
    (.0075)    (.0076)       
          
Comparative Advantage – US  -.0187  **  .0256    -.0182  *  .0325   
    (.0095)  (.0720)  (.0095)  (.0708)  
          
Industry Dummies  No    Yes    No    Yes   
Year  Dummies  No   No   Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations  550     550     550     550    
Adj R-squared  .01     .18     .03     .20    
                          
 
Numbers in Parentheses are Standard Errors. 




Table 5: Determinants of Foreign Entry By Industry and Country, 1988-1998: Acquisitions 
Dependent Variable: Assets Acquired/Total Assets in the Industry    
              
  (1)  (2)   (3)    (4)   
              
Net Income After Taxes/ Total Assets  -.0020    -.0105  *  -.0038    -.0158  ** 
For the Industry  (.0027)    (.0057)    (.0031)    (.0066)   
              
Sales in Year t/ Sales in Year t-1  -.0016  **  -.0016  **  -.0016  **  -.0016  ** 
    (.0006)  (.0007)   (.0006)    (.0007)   
                
Stock Prices – US  -.0011  **  -.0011  **         
    (.0004)  (.0004)          
Real Exchange Rate –US  -.0011    -.0012           
    (.0011)  (.0011)          
Interest Rate – US  .0125  **  .0138  **         
    (.0054)  (.0058)          
GDP Growth Rate – US  .0181  **  .0205  **         
  (.0061)  (.0066)          
              
UBO – GDP Growth  .0096  **  .0099  **  .0093  **  .0093  ** 
    (.0041)  (.0041)   (.0044)    (.0044)   
                
UBO – Stock  .0004    .0004    .0006    .0006   
    (.0004)  (.0004)   (.0004)    (.0004)   
                
UBO – Interest Rate  .0002    .0002    .0003    .0003   
    (.0005)  (.0005)   (.0005)    (.0005)   
                
UBO – Exchange Rate  .00009  **  .00009  **  .00011  **  .00011  ** 
    (.00004)  (.00005)   (.00005)    (.00005)   
                
UBO- Comparative Advantage  .0072  **  .0049    .0071  **  .0049   
    (.0030)  (.0033)   (.0030)    (.0033)   
              
Comparative Advantage - US  -.0078    -.0230    -.0070    -.0131   
    (.0065)  (.0355)   (.0062)    (.0345)   
              
Industry Dummies  No     Yes     No     Yes    
Year Dummies  No     No     Yes     Yes    
Number of Observations  6600     6600     6600     6600    
Adj R-squared  .02     .03     .02     .03    
 
Numbers in Parentheses are Standard Errors. 




Table 6: Determinants of Foreign Entry by Industry and Country, 1988-1998: New 
Establishments  
Dependent Variable: Assets of New Foreign Establishments/Total Assets in the Industry     
          
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
          
Net Income After Taxes / Total   .0006    .0005    .0006    -.0006   
Assets for the Industry  (.0006)    (.0007)    (.0006)    (.0007)   
          
Sales in Year t/ Sales in Year t-1  .00004    .00003    .00003    .00002   
    (.00005)  (.00005)  (.00004)  (.00004)  
            
Stock Prices – US  -.0000    -.0000           
    (.0000)    (.0000)       
Real Exchange Rate –US  -.0003    -.0003           
    (.0003)    (.0003)       
Interest Rate – US  .0005    .0007           
    (.0008)    (.0007)       
GDP Growth Rate – US  .0008    .0011  *         
 (.0006)    (.0006)           
          
UBO – GDP Growth  .0007    .0007    .0007    .0007   
    (.0006)  (.0006)  (.0006)  (.0006)  
            
UBO  –  Stock  .00002  .00002  .00004  .00004  
    (.00005)  (.00005)  (.00005)  (.00005)  
            
UBO – Interest Rate  -.0000    -.0000    -.0001    -.0001   
    (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)  
            
UBO – Exchange Rate  .000002    .000002    .000005    .000005   
    (.000005)  (.000005)  (.000007)  (.000007)  
            
UBO-  Comparative  Advantage  .0016 ** .0015 ** .0016 ** .0015 ** 
    (.0007)  (.0006)  (.0007)  (.0006)  
          
Comparative Advantage - US  -.0014  **  .0014    -.0014  **  .0019   
    (.0007)  (.0061)  (.0006)  (.0061)  
          
Industry Dummies  No     Yes     No     Yes    
Year Dummies  No     No     Yes     Yes    
Number of Observations  6600     6600     6600     6600    
Adj R-squared  .01     .02     .01     .02    
Numbers in Parentheses are Standard Errors. 
* Significant at the 10% Level, ** Significant at the 5% Level  